




Today’s world is complex. Organizational environment is becoming increasingly complicated with the integration 
of various technologies to provide better business delivery. While one’s need of effective and efficient delivery is 
fulfilled through the means of new technologies, such as internet, video, audio, business presentations, and business 
meetings, interplaying with each other, the other need requires more focus and strengthening, that is, information 
security. Businesses have to protect the confidentiality, and the integrity of business information while making their 
systems available for continued business. A few minutes of down time of an e-commerce business site can lead 
to a significant amount of missed business or switching over of the business to a competitive supplier. A breach 
of confidentiality or integrity can lead to reputation loss, huge penalties, or significant revenue loss. To ensure 
information security, we need to act proactively.
When pro-activeness does not stop the breaches, we need to react effectively and efficiently and when breaches 
cannot be avoided we need to recover the businesses as fast as possible to provide continued services to the 
customers. Risk Management when applied in the right spirit, with the deployment of the right methodology, with 
the involvement of the right people, with the application of the right thinking, and with the execution of the actions 
effectively, can provide a reasonably good proactive approach to ensure that there is a high chance of avoiding 
information security breaches or incidents. In spite of being proactive, we cannot be assured that the security 
breaches cannot happen, as this evolving world provides a lot of opportunities and ways to breach the system. 
Incident response provides a reactive method to ensure that the breaches are handled, contained, and recovered from 
effectively. In spite of effective risk management and incident response systems in place, you cannot still be assured 
of continuity of business or speedy recovery when the organization is affected by severe security breaches or disasters. 
Hence the need for effective disaster recovery and business continuity systems to be put in place which is again 
a proactive as well as a reactive system to ensure that the business can still continue in spite of disasters or severe 
security incidents when there is high probability of speedy recovery. Most of the businesses may go out of business or 
may lose a significant number of customers if they are not able to recover within a reasonable time frame. Similarly, 
some of the businesses cannot sustain a short period of lack of availability of systems as some of their business is 
highly critical and needs to be continued at any cost even at a reduced level of activity / volume.
An effective risk management approach supported by an effective and efficient incident response, supported by 
an effective and efficient disaster recovery and business continuity system can ensure that the businesses are able to 
sustain and provide continued services to their clients in spite of serious security breaches or disasters.
Unfortunately, there are hundreds of theories proposed by the experts and varied practices employed by various 
organizations with respect to risk management, incident response, disaster recovery, and business continuity. The 
definition of each of these words, from incident to disaster to recovery to continuity varies from theory to theory. 
In order not to confuse our readers with too many theories and too many definitions we are providing here simple 
definitions in simple terms with respect to each of these as well as a simple and practical way of handling each of 
these, which in our view is suitable to most of the organizations in this world. Further, each of the aspects like Risk 
Management, Incident Response, and Business Continuity Planning can be strongly supported or advocated through 
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a policy driving the same with clear commitment from top management. However, as we have seen, such policies are 
merely put in place either because of the requirement of a standard or because of some customer insistence without 
much thinking and most of the time not revisited for years and are not referred to by the organizational personnel and 
losing the requisite sanctity. Hence, we have not focused in this chapter much on the policies except with regard to 
Incident Response Policy which we have included here as guidance.
Risk
Risk is the chance of something adverse happening which has negative consequences on the organization and in the 
context of this book on information security.
Incident
Any event of consequence to the organization where the organization faces potential loss or is exposed to potential 
loss can be considered as an incident. Loss can be monetary, business, reputation or loss of customers.
Disaster
Any grave situation which brings down the business partially or fully and which is of serious consequence to the 
organization can be considered as a disaster. These often may be on account of natural disasters but sometimes these 
may be on account of manmade activities like terrorism or at other times, they can be on account of severe security 
incidents like a severe infection of malware crashing all the critical servers. In a way, disasters can be considered more 
severe than an incident.
Disaster Recovery
Businesses are ongoing and they are meant to be ongoing or continuous entities. Businesses have competitors who 
always want to take away others’ customers or the market share. Businesses hence have to recover their businesses 
from each disaster speedily so that they are able to service their customers effectively before they plan to switch over 
to the competitor. Even though disaster recovery can mean any recovery from any disaster, many times it is referred 
to in the parlance of recovery of IT infrastructure and systems, which in today’s context performs a lead role in any 
business.
Business Continuity
All businesses are ongoing entities. It may be acceptable for a business which is non-critical to its customers to be shut 
down for a few days but a critical business like banking, health care, telecommunications, e-commerce, and others 
cannot be shut down for more than a few minutes to more than a few days depending on the business. Hence, they 
need to continue to sustain the continuity of the critical business may be at a lower scale or volume than the normal 
scale or volume. Business continuity assures that the plans and systems are in place to continue the business in spite 
of incidents or disasters. Business continuity includes business recovery post any disaster and is one of the important 
components as the speed at which you recover from downtime or disruption or disaster and continue business is 
critical for the success of any organization.
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Risk Management
Risk is the chance that something can go wrong or of an adverse event taking place. In the context of information 
security, risk is something which can impact the availability, confidentiality, or integrity of business or personnel 
information. Examples of some of the common risks include: laptops being stolen and the data on them being 
stolen, a person tail gating somebody stealing some critical files, or a person who got the credentials through social 
engineering means gaining access to the server and copying confidential data, or somebody tapping into the network 
and modifying the messages being sent, or somebody physically stoning or ransacking the building during a riot, or 
that of natural hazards like floods. Threats are the risks. Risks need to be proactively managed.
There are various methodologies to carry out risk assessments by the organization. Organizations are also free to 
come up with their own risk assessment methodologies depending upon their context and their experience. We are 
exploring one such methodology that is easy to use and practical and has been effectively used for some time.
First, risks need to be identified. Then they need to be analyzed for the probability of their occurrence and the 
impact if they do happen. Based on the probability of their occurrence and the impact if they happen, the risk exposure 
or risk level has to be decided. Depending upon the risk exposure of the organization to any particular risk, the risk has 
to be either avoided, transferred, mitigated, or accepted. Risk can be accepted only when the organization is exposed to 
minimal risk that it can sustain. Where the risks are decided to be mitigated, additional controls to mitigate them have to 
be determined. It is normally necessary at this point to determine the additional controls, but it is also extremely important 
to ensure that these controls are effectively deployed and their continued effectiveness is monitored and ensured. 
Organizational internal and external context may vary from time to time, maybe due to a competitor environment or due 
to legal changes or may be due to the way the business is done or else due to the technological changes.
The risks in the revised context need to be analyzed and additional controls need to be implemented as 
required to ensure that the organization continues to drive sufficient controls to protect information security. It is 
recommended that each organization has its own clearly defined risk assessment methodology which drives the risk 
assessment in the organization. This should cover the entire process of risk assessment including the acceptable risk 









Figure 5-1. Risk Assessment Life Cycle
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Again, we have seen some organizations using the asset value to calculate the total financial impact. We have 
seen this approach failing mostly because of lack of accurate asset value. Further, some organizations also try to assess 
the business impact of the risks in financial terms. Again, as we have seen, it turns out to be mostly guess work rather 
than based on uniform, good, prudent ways.
In view of the preceding information, we have provided a simple, practical way that works for most of the 
organizations, which at the same time uses best in class practices from various guidelines and standards including 
from ISO/IEC 27001:2013 – Information Security Management System – Requirements.
Identification of Risk
The first step to identify the risks in the context of information security is to identify all the information assets of the 
organization. Information assets include the infrastructure, facilities, hardware, software, applications, utilities and 
tools, data, employees, contractors, and suppliers which are needed to run any business.
Table 5-1 lists typical information assets that are found in organizations.
Table 5-1. Typical Information Assets
Function Information Asset
Human Resources Employee Personal Records (with PII); Other Employee Records (Offer Letters, 
CVs, Offer Letters, Certificates, Performance Appraisal, etc.); Human Resources 
Management System; Employees (may be further categorized based on type 
of employees); Suppliers/Third Party Vendors; Recruitment Test Papers and 
Answer Keys; etc.
Training Training Material; Training Quiz/Test Papers; Training Feedback and Analysis; 
Online Tools used for the Training; etc.
Marketing & Sales Proposals; Marketing Strategies, Marketing Plans; Communications with the 
Customers including on the scope of new projects, pricing, etc.; Visit Plans of the 
departmental personnel; etc.
Project Management &  
Project Teams (including  
Product Development Teams /  
Engineering Teams)
Proposals; Communications with the Customers; Customer Provided Property 
such as Hardware; Customer Provided Information/Data; Project Artifacts; 
Applications; Utilities; Open Source Software; Third Party Software; Software 
Code Developed; New Concepts/Innovations yet to be patented; New Processes 
Invented; Design Documents, Architecture Documents; etc.
Information Technology Desktops/Workstations; Laptops; Servers; Printers; Communication Equipment; 
CD/DVD Writers/Tape Drive; Backup Tapes; Scanners; External Hard-disks/USB 
Pen Drives; Original Licenses/License Keys; Network Cabling; Firewall,  
Router & Log Analyzer; ISP/External Connectivity; Physical Keys; Specific 
Servers like Anti-Virus Servers, Application Servers, Database Servers, 
Patch Management Server, FTP Server etc.; Other utilities used like Remote 
Connectivity Tools, Monitoring Tools, etc.; Logs of various servers/applications, 
system administrator activity logs; Encryption Keys; Root and other 
Administrative logins and passwords; etc.
(continued)
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The second step is to identify the threats the organization is exposed to with respect to each function within the 
organization. This may be done based on the historical data with the organization; or data obtained from the local 
and / or regional and / or national and / or international agencies or institutes of relevance or other sources of learned 
and reliable information. Additionally, expertise of the organizational employees, contractors, and suppliers is used. 
Another way is to identify the vulnerabilities the organization is exposed to like tail gating, lack of effective policies, 
lack of awareness / knowledge, technical vulnerabilities like security flaws in the utilities or applications used, the 
organization location, and so on, and then identify the threats which may exploit these vulnerabilities. Another 
way is to identify the threats first and then identify the vulnerabilities which may lead to such threats. However, it is 
necessary to identify various pairs of threats and vulnerabilities an information asset is exposed to. Each information 
asset may be exposed to different vulnerabilities which may lead to different threats or each threat may be due to 
different vulnerabilities. Also, different vulnerabilities may sometimes lead to the same threat. For example, a fire 
threat may result from storing old paper records and inflammable material in the organization, the kitchen being 
allowed to use electric or gas stoves, or weak wiring.
A vulnerability of not having adequate awareness of policies may allow some non-employee to tail gate an 
employee which can lead the stranger to steal confidential files or papers, destroying the data center by planting a 
bomb, firing at the employees, or killing the employees. This makes clear the need for identifying different sets of 
vulnerabilities and threats.
Some of the typical pairs of threats and vulnerabilities are listed in Table 5-2.
Function Information Asset
Finance & Legal Vendor Agreements/Contracts; Financial/Banking Details/Records; Statutory 
Records including Notices received, Cases Pending, etc.; Financial Instruments; 
Payroll, Tax and such other details; Digital Signatures; Login Ids and Passwords 
of Authorized Persons authorized to carry out different types of tasks on tools 
like SAP, Oracle Financials, etc.; Compliance Filings; Various reports filed with 
various statutory and regulatory agencies, etc.
Quality Process Documents; Quality Records including Audit Records, Management 
Review Records and other records; Testing Records; Defect Details; Best Known 
Methods; etc.
Note:  a) The functions mentioned are only sample functions and the organizations may have more functions than the 
above or may be differently organized; b) Some of the above assets may be again bucketed into common, specific  
depending upon the differential risks e.g. management laptops have different risks compared to the clerical laptops;  
Customer-provided data like Patient Details, Credit Card details have different risks than the data without much sensitivity 
like generic data like details of the machines on the shop floor, etc., c) Again, the records / documents may be classified as 
hard copy records / documents or soft copy records / documents as they carry different risks; d) Tools / Utilities may have 
to be classified separately depending upon the purpose and their capability; etc.; e) Above list is not comprehensive.  It is 
only illustrative. There may be hundreds of other documents / records / tools / utilities etc. which may be included which 
may also differ from organization to organization.
Table 5-1. (continued)
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The third step is to identify each information asset, the pair of threat and vulnerability, the impact on each of the 
aspects of information security, that is, confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This can be a rating provided to each 
information asset, for each pair of threat and vulnerability, in terms of the impact on each of the information security 
aspects ( confidentiality, integrity and availability) that can be compromised or breached. Table 5-3 describes the 
potential impact on security objectives.1
Table 5-2. Threats and Vulnerabilities
Threat Vulnerability
Malicious Destruction Lack of Physical Security
Theft and Fraud Lack of Physical Security
Fire Lack of Environmental Protection
Flood Lack of Environmental Protection
Misplace / Loss of Documents Inadequate Document / File Handling Procedures
Malicious Destruction Incorrect Access Rights
Theft and Fraud Incorrect Access Rights
Data Corruption & Loss of Data Lack of Backups
Theft and Fraud Access of Production Data to Application Maintenance Engineers
Theft and Fraud Lack of effective software change management leading to unauthorized 
changes
Theft and Fraud Lack of Segregation of Duties
Misuse of Equipment and Facilities Inconsistent Compliance with Security Policies
Access of Facilities / Systems / 
Applications / Data by Ex-Employee or 
others and Possible Thefts and Frauds
Lack of Proper Exit Procedures
Technical Vulnerability Inadequate Configuration
Undesirable Impact Inadequate Patch Validation
Malicious Software Infection Lack of Adequate Monitoring Mechanisms
Malicious Software Infection Technical Incompatibility
Prey to Social Engineering Tricks Inadequate Security Awareness & Training
Misuse of credentials Infrequent change of passwords / Weak Passwords
Technical Failures Improper / Inappropriate Maintenance
Intrusion / Unauthorized Data Access Inadequate Firewall / Router Policies
Single Point of Failure Lack of Redundancy
Service Deficiency Choice of Wrong Service Provider
Note: a) Above list is only illustrative.  It is impossible to cover all threats and vulnerabilities; b) The Threats and  
Vulnerability applicability depends upon the Information Asset.
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Table 5-3. Levels of Impact on Security Objectives1
Security Objective Low Impact Medium Impact High Impact
Confidentiality The unauthorized 
disclosure of information 
could be expected to have 
a limited adverse effect on 
organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or 
individuals.
The unauthorized disclosure 
of information could 
be expected to have a 
serious adverse effect on 
organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or 
individuals.
The unauthorized disclosure 
of information could be 
expected to have a severe or 
catastrophic adverse effect 
on organizational operations, 
organizational assets,  
or individuals.
Integrity The unauthorized 
modification or  
destruction of information 
could be expected to have 
a limited adverse effect on 
organizational operations, 
organizational assets,  
or individuals.
The unauthorized 
modification or destruction 
of information could 
be expected to have a 
serious adverse effect on 
organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or 
individuals.
The unauthorized 
modification or destruction 
of information could be 
expected to have a severe or 
catastrophic adverse effect 
on organizational operations, 
organizational assets,  
or individuals
Availability The disruption of access 
to or use of information 
or an information system 
could be expected to have 
a limited adverse effect on 
organizational operations, 
organizational assets,  
or individuals.
The disruption of access 
to or use of information 
or an information system 
could be expected to have 
a serious adverse effect on 
organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or 
individuals.
The disruption of access to 
or use of information or an 
information system could be 
expected to have a severe or 
catastrophic adverse effect 
on organizational operations, 
organizational assets,  
or individuals.
Amplification A limited adverse  
effect means that, for 
example, the loss of 
confidentiality, integrity,  
or availability might:  
(i) cause a degradation in 
organizational capability 
to an extent and duration 
that the organization 
is able to perform its 
primary functions, but 
the effectiveness of the 
functions is noticeably 
reduced; (ii) result in minor 
damage to organizational 
assets; (iii) result in minor 
financial loss; or  
(iv) result in minor harm to 
individuals.
A serious adverse effect 
means that, for example, 
the loss of confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability 
might: (i) cause a significant 
degradation in organizational 
capability to an extent and 
duration that the organization 
is able to perform its primary  
functions, but the 
effectiveness of the functions 
is significantly reduced;  
(ii) result in significant 
damage to organizational 
assets; (iii) result in significant 
financial loss; or (iv) result 
in significant harm to 
individuals that does not 
involve loss of life or serious 
life threatening injuries.
A severe or catastrophic 
adverse effect means that, 
for example, the loss of 
confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability might: (i) cause a 
severe degradation in or loss 
of organizational capability 
to an extent and duration 
that the organization is not 
able to perform one or more 
of its primary functions;  
(ii) result in major damage 
to organizational assets; 
(iii) result in major financial 
loss; or (iv) result in severe 
or catastrophic harm to 
individuals involving loss of 
life or serious life threatening 
injuries.
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Low impact on any security objective is given a value of 1, medium impact on any security objective is given a 
value of 2 and high impact on any security objective is given a value of 3. If any security objective is not applicable 
to the information asset under consideration then it is given a value of 0. For each information asset, for each pair of 
threat and vulnerability, the impact value for confidentiality plus the impact value for the integrity plus the impact 
value for availability gives the total asset impact value. Asset impact is optionally categorized as C1, C2, C3 based on 
the following total asset impact values listed in Table 5-4.
Table 5-4. Asset Category Classification Based on Asset Impact Value
Asset Impact Category Total Asset Impact Value
C1 – High impact asset Total Asset Impact Value of 7 or 8 or 9
C2 – Medium impact asset Total Asset Impact Value of 4 or 5 or 6
C3 – Low impact asset Total Asset Impact Value of 1 or 2 or 3
Table 5-5. Risk Probability Ratings
Probability Description Probability Value
Almost certain Several times a week or day 5
Likely More than once per month 4
Moderate Up to several times a year 3
Unlikely 2–5 times every 5 years 2
Rare Unlikely to occur 1
The fourth step is to identify the controls already implemented by the organization to manage this risk. These 
controls may be physical security like security guards; awareness sessions wherein the employees are made aware of 
the do’s and don’ts or specific steps to be taken to avoid, control, and mitigate the risks; or implementation of a tool in 
the organization like a firewall that eliminates such a risk.
Risk Analysis
Risk analysis is the next important step. At the end of the risk analysis we need to quantify the risk in terms of 
quantified risk exposure. This is different from the impact levels on confidentiality, integrity, and availability we 
discussed in the earlier paragraphs.
For a particular information asset, for each of the pair of threat and vulnerability, we identify the actual impact 
on the business. For example, a banking server compromised and misused may impact the entire business severely, 
including potential loss of customer confidence, reputation loss, loss of data integrity, or monetary loss. Then we 
determine the probability of this risk (also known as the likelihood of risk), as shown in Table 5-5. Probability of the 
rating is from 1% to 99%. A probability of 100% means that the risk is already true and has already occurred.
Then for each pair of threat and vulnerability we identify the possibility of detection and assign a rating in a scale 
of 1 to 5. However, here the lower the possibility of detection, the higher the rating and the higher the possibility of 
detection the lower the rating, as shown in Table 5-6.
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Once all three (total asset value, probability of occurrence and the rating for the possibility of detection) are 
determined for each of the threat and vulnerability pairs, then the risk exposure is quantified using the following 
formula:
Risk Exposure = Total Asset Impact Value x Probability of Occurrence x Possibility of Detection
The organization should have decided the risk exposure it considers as acceptable as a part of the risk assessment 
methodology adopted by it. It should not be too high that it leads to acceptance of every risk and it should not be too 
low that it leads to compulsory mitigation, avoidance, or transfer of every risk. Organizations are free to set their own 
acceptable risk xposure threshold depending upon their risk appetite.
Risk Responses
For each pair of threat and vulnerability, the calculated risk exposure is compared with the risk exposure considered 
acceptable to the organization (i.e., acceptable risk exposure). Where the risk exposure is less than the acceptable risk 
exposure, the risks are normally accepted by the organization and no further action is taken.
Acceptable risk exposure is decided by the organization as per its risk assessment methodology. Normally, this 
is the value of risk exposure below which the organization perceives the risks need not be focused on as the risks are 
very low and not worth pursuing.
There may be some other risks that the organizational management may want to consciously accept, such as the 
organization may allow mobile phones with cameras to be brought into the organization even though there is a risk 
that the cameras may be misused. The risk exposure in this case may be more than the acceptable risk exposure value. 
But, the organization may want to accept the risk because of its belief in the employees, considering other positive 
uses of mobile phones, not to demotivate the employees. Such practices of accepting the risk or not accepting the risk 
based on a specific context differ widely from organization to organization. As we have seen, some organizations may 
be very conservative in accepting the risks whereas other organizations may be relatively liberal in this regard when it 
particularly relates to inconveniencing the employees.
If the risk exposure is more than the acceptable risk exposure value then either the risk has to be avoided by 
mistake proofing (i.e., by implementing such measures that eliminate the possibility of such a risk occurring at all, 
such as if there is an unused entry or exit – mistake proofing is done by locking and sealing it permanently), the risk 
has to be transferred to others, or the risk has to be mitigated. Some of the possibilities of the transference of risk 
is to take up insurance for the risk of loss from fire or transference of risk of ineffectiveness or inefficiency through 
outsourcing of the work to the experts in that area. However, transference of risk is not possible in most of the cases.
Where the risks are not possible to be either avoided or to be transferred then they need to be mitigated. 
Mitigation is carried out by determining additional controls to be implemented. These controls may be awareness 
training, or may be implementation of a tool to monitor and provide alerts so that timely actions can be taken, or may 
be implementation of methods and techniques like encryption, or may be implementation of a security certificate 
for the URL, or may be introduction of additional validations and / or exception flows in the application software, or 
implementation of better processes.  The additional controls implemented should be such that they have either the 
capability to reduce the probability of occurrence or reduce the impact or increase the probability of detection or a 
Table 5-6. Possible Detection Ratings
Possibility of detection Description Probability Value
Extremely Low Probability of detection is 0 to 20 % 5
Low Probability of detection is 21 to 40 % 4
Medium Probability of detection is 41 to 60 % 3
High Probability of detection is 61 to 80 % 2
Extremely High Probability of detection is 81 to 100 % 1
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combination of these. These additional controls or actions implemented should have to be assigned in such a way 
that there is high probability that the risk exposure is reduced below the acceptable value of risk subsequent to the 
implementation of the additional controls. All the additional controls to be implemented including the risk avoidance 
and risk transfer actions have to be assigned to relevant owners for effective actions.
Perceived risk exposure post implementation of additional controls should be collated against the existing risk 
to understand whether the additional controls are likely to bring the risk below the acceptable risk exposure value. 
Where it is perceived that the additional controls are unlikely to reduce the risk exposure below the acceptable value, 
the risks are to be brought to the attention of senior management of the organization and approval has to be obtained 
for bearing the residual risk.
Execution of the Risk Treatment Plans
The risk treatment plans (actions on account of earlier steps) are assigned through an Excel sheet or organizational 
action tracking tool to the respective owners and are tracked through the same on a regular basis. It is essential that 
the requisite focus and attention is provided by the management to ensure that these actions are invariably taken. 
Otherwise, the entire risk management exercise will be futile. Risk owners not only execute the necessary actions,  
but also ensure that the necessary processes to implement them effectively are defined and everybody (as relevant 
and required) is trained on those processes. Awareness of the risks and the actions required to be taken by all  
(as relevant and required) are also made known to everybody. The assigned action owners, upon implementation 
of the actions, check for the revised probability of occurrence, revised impact rating, and revised rate of detection. 
Where the risk exposure upon effective implementation of controls has not led to lowering the risk exposure below 
the acceptable risk value, then additional controls have to be implemented. Management has to be kept informed 
of the necessity and implementation of such actions so that requisite resources are deployed and the support is 
accorded for their effective implementation.
The Importance of Conducting a Periodic Risk Assessment
The organizational risk scenario changes when the business changes, the infrastructure changes, the technology 
deployed changes, and the competence of the personnel changes. These changes cannot be ignored, as these have 
the potential to impact the effectiveness of the controls already implemented and change the earlier risk profile of the 
organization. Whenever such significant changes are carried out by the organization or on a periodical basis (ideally 
on a six month to maximum of annual basis), re-risk assessment has to be carried out across the organization, and 
additional controls as required have to be determined and implemented. Proactive approach in this regard ensures 
that the effectiveness of the controls is maintained.
Figure 5-2 shows detail from a template that may be used for a risk assessment.
Figure 5-2. Risk Assessment Template (detail)
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Incident Response
Before we discuss incident response, we need to be able to differentiate between three aspects: information security 
weakness, information security event, and information security incident.
To cite an example, suppose an employee tailgates another employee without swiping in his access card. This 
is a security event but cannot be considered as a security incident as the employee would have otherwise also come 
inside by obtaining a temporary access card if he had forgotten his access card. Suppose the tailgating is done by 
an ex-employee or a stranger. Then it is a security incident as it has the potential of leading to loss or disruption 
etc. Information security weakness in this case may be that once the employee has swiped his access card and 
gets into the organization the door takes a lot of time to close and lock down. Information security weakness may 
be that a utility you are using in the organization has a security loophole. Information security weaknesses if left 
unattended may lead to information security incidents. All the information security events may not be information 
security incidents but need to be evaluated to check whether they point towards a possibility of an information 
security incident. For example, a log shows that somebody was trying to access one of our servers from outside the 
organization. On checking, you may find that it was one of the employees who had authorization to have access to that 
information. Hence, it was an information security event which you cannot ignore, but upon evaluation you found 
that it is not an information security incident.
Potential security incidents need to be proactively protected against but some of the security incidents cannot 
be protected against like the unknown vulnerabilities in an application or operating system or a new virus or worm 
attack. However, where it is not possible to proactively protect against these we need to have alerting or detective 
mechanisms which alert us to the possibility of a security incident. For example a newly downloaded program is 
behaving suspiciously as found by your anti-virus or anti-malware tool. You need to check for what kind of suspicious 
activities are carried out by it, where it was downloaded from, and whether it is performing as intended, before you 
decide to act on it. Firewalls, IDS/IPS, anti-virus, and anti-malware software are some of the tools / utilities which 
provide you detective controls.
Once a security incident is identified, it cannot be left alone without attending to it. If the security incident was 
the tailgating by an ex-employee / a stranger or an application functionality behaving erratically, then the security 
incident has to be investigated to find out the root cause(s) for the same, so that corrective actions can be determined 
and taken to either fix the root cause(s) or mistake proof the issue itself.
If the incident is a serious one like a worm attack or a virus attack with serious implications then the actions or 
response has to be quick to contain the issue from spreading and containing the consequential damage.
In view of such a serious situation, having an effective incident response is necessary for all organizations.  
In order to achieve this objective, all organizations need to follow a well ordered Incident Response Life Cycle and 
have a comprehensively detailed Incident Response Plan. Incident Response Life Cycle defines various phases 
through which an incident has to be managed for incident responses to be effective not only in containing and 
spreading the effects, but also avoid recurrence of same or similar incidents. Incident Response Plan is the output of 
the Incident Response Preparation Phase and provides a well thought-out and well-articulated Incident Response 
Plan which enables the organizations to deal with incidents effectively and efficiently.
Figure 5-3 illustrates the Incident Response Life Cycle.
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Incident Response Policy, Plan, and Processes
Incident Response Policy should be put in place by management of the organization demonstrating its commitment 
to the Incident Response. This policy directs and provides guidance to the entire organization and provides the base 
for the Incident Response Plan and related processes.
Incident Response Policy
Incident Response Policy provides management direction towards Incident Response and also emphasizes the 
management’s commitment to the same and highlights the “musts” as far as Incident Response is concerned. 
Incident Response Policy covers the following areas.
Purpose and Scope of the Policy
This should clearly define the purpose of incident response, namely, what the organization wants to achieve through 
incident response. This should also describe the scope of incident response in the organization. The scope can be the 
entire organization or a particular unit or a specific group of units and the type of incidents and circumstances.2  
It highlights management’s commitment and addresses what the management feels as mandatory to be followed with 
regard to incident response.
Definition of Information Security Incidents and Related Terms2
From organization to organization, the definition of information security incidents can differ. It is necessary that the 
organization clearly defines what it means by an incident and related terms like incident response, incident recovery, 




























Figure 5-3. Incident Response Life Cycle2
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Organizational Structure, Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities
Any policy cannot be implemented effectively and efficiently unless there is a proper structure to support it in the 
organization. The structure should be composed of clear roles with clear responsibilities. For an incident response, 
many times somebody needs to act expeditiously without any bureaucratic approval cycle in order to carry out 
immediate containment or control activities. Therefore it is necessary that some of the roles have to be provided with 
authorities which may be beyond their normal authorities. An organization’s structure, roles, responsibilities, and 
designated authorities have to be clearly defined and described so that there is no ambiguity, and that no confusing 
actions are taken.
All the people in the organization have to be clearly informed of the organization structure, roles, and 
responsibilities as the incident response has to be quick and requires coordination between various functions and 
personnel of the organization and cannot happen without this clarity across the organization. Otherwise, egos and 
organizational bureaucratic setups can create hurdles during an incident response which can delay the response 
significantly leading to a higher level of disruption or damage or theft. The roles, responsibilities, and authorities should 
provide the authority to the incident response team even to confiscate the equipment or disconnect the equipment and 
to monitor and investigate suspicious activities.2 This also should make it clear what and which types of communications 
to the outside world or to the related agencies are permitted and who is permitted to carry out the same.
Incident Response Teams constitute personnel with complementary skills, experience, and capabilities. Head 
of the Incident Response Team is normally vested with significant authority to make decisions at times of need to 
effectively contain and recover from incidents.
Ratings of Incidents
All incidents do not require the same level of attention. Some of the incidents may be localized incidents and may 
have a local impact. Some may be organization-wide incidents with organization-wide impact. Some incidents 
may impact critical business areas and others may impact non-critical business areas. Some incidents may be 
easy to be responded to while some others may be very complex which can be responded to only by experts. Some 
incidents may have high impacts and some incidents may have low impacts on the organization. In order that the 
organizational personnel and the incident response team do not get confused, clear guidelines have to be provided 
as to the severity of various types of incidents. Speed of action required to be taken and the priority depends upon the 
severity rating of the incident.
Measurements
Any critical activity in the organization has to be measured to understand either its effectiveness or efficiency or both 
of these. The measurements provide us with the clear view of where we stand with respect to performance and bring 
out the opportunities for improvement. But, measurements to be made should be appropriate and should be defined 
in clear terms so that the measurements actually provide us the information as per the intended objectives of these 
measurements.
Incident Response Plan
The Incident Response Plan should clearly define what is considered as an incident in the organization. Second it 
should clearly identify the potential types of incidents the organization is exposed to based on the infrastructure of 
the organization, IT architecture of the organization, types of operating systems, and tools and utilities used by the 
organization. Third, it has to clearly describe what needs to be done if a new and unanticipated incident is faced 
by the organization. This may include who needs to be notified, and who will make a final call as to what needs to 
be done. The Incident Response Plan also has to specify external agencies or forums if any need to be informed or 
consulted with.
The Incident Response Plan covers the following areas.
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Purpose and Scope
Purpose of the Incident Response Plan and the scope as to which type of incidents, pertaining to which location and 
which functions is made clear in this section.
Strategies, Goals, and Approach to Incident Response
Incident response strategies, goals, and approaches including the incident monitoring strategies, incident response 
strategies, strategies related to organization to effectively handle incidents including the team composition, internal 
and external coordination, and total or partial outsourcing of the incident response need to be clearly planned for 
and appropriate responsibilities are to be assigned to named personnel with appropriate backups so that there is a 
guarantee that in case of any incidents, they are handled effectively.
Internal and External Communication Plan
The communication for identifying the incidents, declaring the incidents, and responding to the incidents needs to be 
clear and should come from the persons authorized to carry out such communications. The communications should 
be within the defined boundaries and the communications should be appropriately worded. The clarity as to how 
internal communications need to be handled and how the external communications need to be restricted are to be 
clearly planned for.
Plan for the Incident Response Capability2
An organization requires adequate, suitable incident response capability in order to be effective and efficient in 
incident response. Any organization has to assess its current incident response capability in terms of availability of 
techniques, tools, and utilities and the resource competence including the skills to handle incidents. If it does not 
have the internal capability either the option to outsource or to acquire the capability through new recruitments has 
to be looked into. Plans to have appropriate, adequate, and suitable incident response capability have to be clearly 
delineated with action responsibility and target dates clearly assigned.
Measurement of Incident Response Capability and its Effectiveness
It is necessary to measure the incident response capability of the organization including that of the outsourced 
portion of the incident response capability. Periodic assessment of the same will close up the gaps between 
the expectations and the current realities. Organizations are not static. People with expertise and assigned key 
responsibilities may leave the organization. The same holds true for outsourced organizations.
At the time of outsourcing, the particular organization may have excellent capabilities but over a period of time 
it is possible that it would have lost the capability or would have had its capability reduced because of the attrition 
of key people. Further, the new technologies being implemented or changes to the technologies being implemented 
can make the requisite incident response capability differ from what was originally planned. Further, we also need to 
measure the effectiveness of the implemented capability. These may be possible to be measured by the responses that 
have been provided to the incidents which have occurred. Similarly, it may be possible to test some of the incident 
response through mock scenarios and testing of the possible incidents.
It is important to consider the various types of incidents possible and how they have to be handled so that there  
is no ambiguity. At least processes have to be clearly defined in respect to high impact incidents. These may be based 
on the common attack vectors.
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Integration with the Other Plans of the Organization
An organization may have other plans like Risk Management, Disaster Recovery, and Business Continuity Plans. It is 
necessary that all these plans are integrated in such a way that each plan complements the other plans and does not 
contradict the other plans.
Incident Response Processes
Incident response processes are the important elements for the success of the incident responses. Various possible 
incidents from virus infection to malware infection to server crashes to denial of service attacks to bomb threats to 
many such possible incidents have to be thoroughly planned. Where the possibility of these incidents is high, the 
incident responses have to be discussed and planned for by having appropriate incident response processes.
These processes have to be detailed enough with various possible scenarios and appropriate responses. These 
processes have to detail how these incidents are identified and analyzed. These need to be supported additionally by 
templates, forms, and checklists as relevant so that it is easy to implement the expectations of these incident response 
processes effectively.
Incident Response Teams
Incident Response Team(s) is/are an important component and highly influence the success or failure of the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the incident response. This team requires the knowledge, experience, and skills to 
ensure that the incident detection, incident containment, and incident eradication are carried out effectively and 
efficiently.
Incident Response Team(s) can be dedicated teams or may be “on call” teams depending upon the criticality 
of the business, exposure of the organization to the incidents, competence of the IT resources, and resilience of the 
information security infrastructure.
Incident Response Team structuring based on distribution of the Responsibilities
Incident Response Teams are normally structured based on best fit distribution of the responsibilities among  
various centers.
Centralized Incident Response Teams2
Centralized Incident Response Teams are usually suitable for smaller organizations with less geographical spread. 
In big organizations such a structure can lead to lack of effective coordination due to various reasons like cultural 
reasons, internal political reasons, and bureaucratic decision making.
Distributed Incident Response Teams2
Distributed Incident Response Teams are suitable for multi-business, multi-locational organizations with distributed 
IT infrastructure. Each of these centers or group of centers may have their own Incident Response Team.  In today’s 
world, where each center is connected to the other centers and where the same business is carried out in various 
geographies and where the IT infrastructure is distributed based on efficiency and competency, it is necessary to have 
a person or group coordinating the efforts of these various Incident Response Teams as the same incident may affect 
multiple locations or an incident at one center may impact the business carried out at other centers.
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Hybrid Incident Response Teams
It is possible that the expertise to handle the incidents in not uniformly distributed across various locations of an 
organization. In such a case it is possible to constitute a Central Incident Response Team at the prime location of the 
organization or technological hub of the organization with Incident Response Teams at the other centers as required. 
Incident response for some of the smaller centers or the centers which may lack the requisite expertise may be directly 
taken care of by a Central Incident Response Team. In such a model, it is possible to authorize the individual Incident 
Response Teams at various centers to act independently in case of local incidents and keep such incidents reported 
to the Central Incident Response Team. But, in case of purely local incidents the Central Incident Response Team 
assumes the advisory role if any support is required by the local Incident Response Teams. All the incidents which 
have impact across the businesses or locations or of higher impact are handled by the Central Incident Response 
Team. Necessary actions are directly taken by the Central Incident Response Team or as per the directions of the 
Central Incident Response Team by the distributed Incident Response Teams.
Incident Response Team Structuring Based on who Constitutes the Teams
The teams have to be constituted with appropriate competent resources. This depends upon the business, technology 
infrastructure, tools, and utilities used. If the team is not composed of competent resources it is possible that incidents 
may not be recognized sufficiently early or incident response may be delayed or incident response may not be 
effective. All organizations may not have in-house competence for effective and efficient incident response. They may 
have to complement internal competence with external expertise to effectively deal with incident response. Again the 
Incident Response Team can be constituted with full-time members or part time “on call” members. This depends 
upon the business criticality as well as IT infrastructure robustness, probable incidents, and IT resilience. The pros 
and cons of each of these structures have to be evaluated in the context of the organization and then an appropriate 
decision has to be made based on the well-evaluated and well-considered trade-off 3.
Fully Employee Constituted Incident Response Teams
If the organization has adequate internal competence then the Incident Response Team can be constituted internally. 
But, if the Incident Response Team is required to be available 24x7 and required to be deployed as it is, it is better to 
constitute a separate Incident Response Team with the experts specifically recruited by the organization. However, if it 
is enough to constitute an “on call” Incident Response Team then it is more effective to constitute the team internally 
with the expertise already available in-house.
Fully Outsourced Incident Response Teams
Here, the organization arranges for the entire team to be constituted by outside experts. Usually this may be through 
a single outsourced entity. However, it may be a group of organizations to which the outsourcing is done with 
complementary expertise, even though such a scenario is seen less in practice. This type of team constitution is 
usually found in smaller organizations for which it is difficult to internally source the requisite expertise.  It is possible 
that such teams may have a tough time providing for effective and efficient Incident Response sometimes because of 
bureaucratic responses or hindrances or because of lack of effective authority delegated to them.
Hybrid Teams: Partially Constituted by Employees and Partially Constituted by 
Outsourced Contractors
Here, the organization constitutes its Incident Response Team with chosen internal employees and chosen 
outsourced contractors. This model is likely to work the best because the internal expert resources are complemented 
through other rare / non-available skills from the outsourced contractors. As the internal employees constitute a good 
portion of the team bureaucratic hindrances or lack of authority impeding effectiveness and efficiency of the incident 
response may not be an issue in this case.
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Ensuring Effectiveness of Incident Response
As discussed earlier, incident response is not always easy for the following reasons:
The actual incident may be the one that was not anticipated•	
Key members of the incident response team and their backups may not be available when the •	
incident actually happens
Incident response plan is beautifully drafted but the stakeholders are not trained effectively on •	
the plan
Incident response teams are not staffed suitably or adequately•	
Incident response plan was not updated for a long time and has become non-useful because •	
of the changes to the infrastructure and systems over a period of time
Incident Response Processes are outdated and are not in sync with the currently deployed •	
technology
For effective incident response execution the following steps have become essential:
Preparation2
Any battle is half won before it begins if the preparations are done well. Similarly, preparation is very important to 
ensure the effectiveness of the incident response. Following are the important aspects of the preparation:2
Risk assessment and identification of the risk mitigation steps to overcome the non-acceptable •	
risks including the threats likely to lead to incidents
Training the resources on the possible incidents and providing them the awareness and •	
knowledge to enable them to effectively prevent the incidents, such as virus prevention 
programs, strong password, or encryption training
Effective formulation of the Incident Response Team constituting suitable and appropriate •	
structure and members with the requisite capability
Well thought out and preventive IT infrastructure and physical security infrastructure•	
Effective Incident Response Policy, Incident Response Plan, and supporting Incident •	
Response Processes
Validation of the Incident Response Plans and Incident Response Processes to ensure that •	
they work when required
Training on the execution of the Incident Response Plans•	
Regular update to the Incident Response Policy, Incident Response Plan, and  •	
Incident Response Processes in tune with the changes to or at the organization
Configuring the setup including those of tools / utilities used by the organization •	
appropriately
Important aspects to be considered during the preparation are:2
Internal and external contact details including those of on-call members, Incident Response •	
Team members, and external agencies.
Incident Reporting Mechanisms including the e-mail ids, contact phone numbers, or tools / •	
utilities through which incidents can be reported.
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Incident Response War Room: This is the place designated for the Incident Response Team to •	
operate. Primarily the Incident Response Team Leader directs and guides the team from here 
and can be contacted here. This room is provided with multiple telephone lines and other 
accessories to ensure effective communication in and out of this War Room.
Incident Tracking Tool/Utility: Incidents need to be tracked including the status of the •	
incidents and various actions taken at various places to ensure that the actions are executed as 
proposed. This is the incident repository which needs to be kept updated and which provides 
the Incident Response Team Leader to provide accurate and correct information related to 
incident status to internal and external stakeholders, as relevant.
Readily available or accessible Incident Response Plan and Processes•	
Secure Storage Facility: This is provided to store and preserve the evidence obtained during •	
incident investigation.
Mobiles or Tablets: These enable effective communication during the incident among internal •	
and external stakeholders.
Incident Analysis Hardware and Software such as Forensic Workstations, Backup Devices, •	
Laptops and/or desktops, Servers, Portable Printers, Forensic Software, Digital Cameras, 
Video / Audio Recorders, Blank Media and other tools / utilities as relevant which help out in 
effectively analyzing the incidents; analyzing, collecting, and preserving the evidence.2
Incident Analysis Resources including List of Ports, Network Diagrams / Maps, Configuration •	
Management Database, Operating System and Database and Application related 
documentation.2
Incident Mitigation Software which enables restoration and recovery of Operating Systems, •	
Applications enabling IRT to create clean OS and application images.
Incident Detection2
Incident detection2 is the next important step.  All the incidents are not possible to be anticipated. However, there are 
some common threads among certain groups of incidents and these are normally known as Common Attack Vectors. 
These Common Attack Vectors enable us to understand and use the possibility of providing more specific responses. 
Table 5-7 lists the Common Attack Vectors.2
Table 5-7. Common Attack Vectors2
Common Attack Vector Description
External / Removable Media An attack executed from removable media or a peripheral device—for example, 
malicious code spreading onto a system from an infected USB flash drive
Attrition An attack that employs brute force methods to compromise, degrade, or destroy 
systems, networks, or services (e.g., a DDoS intended to impair or deny access to a 
service or application; a brute force attack against an authentication mechanism, 
such as passwords, CAPTCHAS, or digital signatures)
Web An attack executed from a website or web-based application—for example, a 
cross-site scripting attack used to steal credentials or a redirect to a site that 
exploits a browser vulnerability and installs malware
(continued)
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Precursors and Indicators of Incidents2
It is most difficult to understand whether the incident is occurring or has already occurred and the type, extent, and 
/ or magnitude of the incident. Precursors provide an indication that there is a possibility of an incident happening, 
such as if there is an email or telephonic threat to the organization, a terrorist attack, or there have been failed 
attempts made to break into a critical system.
Indicators provide the signals that the incident is either occurring at this point of time or has already occurred, 
such as file checksums do not match, some data is leaked and published on a public website, somebody has already 
defaced the website, an increased number of files are getting corrupted day by day, or higher than normal utilization 
of the traffic is observed. It is possible that some of these indicators may be false positives and would have happened 
because of an employee’s unintended mistake which was not even observed by the employee concerned or because 
of a wrong restoration by oversight or a wrong update. We may not have either a precursor or an indicator in case of 
some of the incidents, such as a new exploit of a new vulnerability just uncovered by a hacker or a misconfiguration 
newly exploited by an internal knowledgeable employee.
However, these precursors and indicators, when available, provide us an opportunity to speed up our responses 
and many times provide us the opportunity to either stop an incident from happening or reduce the impact of the 
incident.
Sources of Precursors and Indicators
Some of the sources of the precursors and indicators are described in Table 5-8.2
Common Attack Vector Description
Email An attack executed via an email message or attachment—for example, exploit 
code disguised as an attached document or a link to a malicious website in the 
body of an email message
Impersonation An attack involving replacement of something benign with something malicious— 
for example, spoofing, man in the middle attacks, rogue wireless access points, 
and SQL injection attacks all involve impersonation
Improper Usage Any incident resulting from violation of an organization’s acceptable usage 
policies by an authorized user, excluding the above categories; for example, a 
user installs file sharing software, leading to the loss of sensitive data; or a user 
performs illegal activities on a system
Loss or Theft of Equipment The loss or theft of a computing device or media used by the organization, such as 
a laptop, smartphone, or authentication token
Other An attack that does not fit into any of the other categories
Table 5-7. (continued)
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Table 5-8. Common Sources of Precursors and Indicators2
Source Description
Alerts
IDPSs IDPS products identify suspicious events and record pertinent data regarding 
them, including the date and time the attack was detected, the type of attack, 
the source and destination IP addresses, and the username (if applicable 
and known). Most IDPS products use attack signatures to identify malicious 
activity; the signatures must be kept up to date so that the newest attacks can 
be detected. IDPS software often produces false positives—alerts that indicate 
malicious activity is occurring, when in fact there has been none. Analysts 
should manually validate IDPS alerts either by closely reviewing the recorded 
supporting data or by getting related data from other sources.
SIEMs Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) products are similar to 
IDPS products, but they generate alerts based on analysis of log data  
(see below).
Antivirus and antispam software Antivirus software detects various forms of malware, generates alerts, and 
prevents the malware from infecting hosts. Current antivirus products are 
effective at stopping many instances of malware if their signatures are kept 
up to date. Antispam software is used to detect spam and prevent it from 
reaching users’ mailboxes. Spam may contain malware, phishing attacks, and 
other malicious content, so alerts from antispam software may indicate attack 
attempts.
File integrity checking software File integrity checking software can detect changes made to important files 
during incidents. It uses a hashing algorithm to obtain a cryptographic 
checksum for each designated file. If the file is altered and the checksum is 
recalculated, an extremely high probability exists that the new checksum 
will not match the old checksum. By regularly recalculating checksums and 
comparing them with previous values, changes to files can be detected.
Third-party monitoring services Third parties offer a variety of subscription-based and free monitoring 
services. An example is fraud detection services that will notify an organization 
if its IP addresses, domain names, etc. are associated with current incident 
activity involving other organizations. There are also free real-time blacklists 
with similar information. Another example of a third-party monitoring service 
is a CSIRC notification list; these lists are often available only to other incident 
response teams.
Logs
Operating system, service and 
application logs
Logs from operating systems, services, and applications (particularly audit-
related data) are frequently of great value when an incident occurs, such as 
recording which accounts were accessed and what actions were performed. 
Organizations should require a baseline level of logging on all systems and 
a higher baseline level on critical systems. Logs can be used for analysis by 
correlating event information. Depending on the event information, an  
alert can be generated to indicate an incident.
(continued)




Network device logs Logs from network devices such as firewalls and routers are not typically a 
primary source of precursors or indicators. Although these devices are usually 
configured to log blocked connection attempts, they provide little information 
about the nature of the activity. Still, they can be valuable in identifying 
network trends and in correlating events detected by other devices.
Network flows A network flow is a particular communication session occurring between 
hosts. Routers and other networking devices can provide network flow 
information, which can be used to find anomalous network activity caused by 
malware, data exfiltration, and other malicious acts. There are many standards 
for flow data formats, including NetFlow, sFlow, and IPFIX.
Publicly Available Information
Information on new  
vulnerabilities and exploits
Keeping up with new vulnerabilities and exploits can prevent some incidents 
from occurring and assist in detecting and analyzing new attacks. The National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD) contains information on vulnerabilities. 
Organizations such as US-CERT33 and CERT®/CC periodically provide threat 
update information through briefings, web postings, and mailing lists.
People
People from within the 
organization
Users, system administrators, network administrators, security staff, and others 
from within the organization may report signs of incidents. It is important 
to validate all such reports. One approach is to ask people who provide such 
information how confident they are of the accuracy of the information. 
Recording this estimate along with the information provided can help 
considerably during incident analysis, particularly when conflicting data is 
discovered.
People from other organizations Reports of incidents that originate externally should be taken seriously. For 
example, the organization might be contacted by a party claiming a system 
at the organization is attacking its systems. External users may also report 
other indicators, such as a defaced web page or an unavailable service. Other 
incident response teams also may report incidents. It is important to have 
mechanisms in place for external parties to report indicators and for trained 
staff to monitor those mechanisms carefully; this may be as simple as setting 
up a phone number and e-mail address, configured to forward messages to the 
help desk.
Analysis of the Incidents:2
As discussed earlier, all the indicators at all times may not provide accurate information and may lead to false 
positives. Hence, the mere presence of an indicator is not sufficient to presume that an incident has occurred or is 
occurring. A suspected incident has to be analyzed based on the indicators and other related information and then 
the analysis has to be confirmed. At the same time, it is necessary to understand the cause of the incident (may be an 
intentional attack, may be a misconfigured system, may be an employee mistake, may be unintentional violation of a 
policy impacting the system, etc.) to effectively deal with the incident. Many a time, experts may have to be involved 
in the analysis of the incidents to understand the correct causes and to arrive at effective solutions. Sometimes it may 
be too late to do anything as the confidential information is already released to the public. Sometimes only partial 
containment is possible. However, corrective action should be identified to either remove the possibility of such an 
incident happening or the possibility of root cause(s) from happening.
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Table 5-9 details actions that may help in simplifying incident analysis, or making incident analysis  
relatively easy.2
Table 5-9. Actions that may help in analyzing incidents effectively.2
Action Description
Profiling of Networks and Systems Profiling is measuring the characteristics of expected activity so that changes 
to it can be more easily identified. Changes possibly indicate an incident even 
though sometimes these may be false positives.
Understanding Normal Behaviors Study of networks, systems, and applications to understand their normal 
behavior will provide us sufficient clues to understand and identify abnormal 
behavior.
Creating a Log Retention Policy Log information is critical information. This will provide leads into possible 
threads from earlier activities like reconnaissance activities. Having the logs 
for sufficient lengths of time ensures that there is a traceability to the thread of 
related activities as some of the incidents may be uncovered after substantial 
time of its occurrence.
Performing Event Correlation Events can be correlated from different sources of information e.g. firewall logs 
to server logs to the application logs.
Clock Synchronization Clock synchronization across all the physical and logical systems ensures that 
the incidents and evidences can be correlated easily. This provides adequate 
strength to the evidence collected from the legal stand point.
Maintaining and Using  
a Knowledge Base
This knowledge base acts as a quick reference source for the incident handlers. 
It should be easily searchable database. This knowledge base needs to be 
maintained updated with changes to the same in tune with the changes to the 
organizational scenario.
Using Internet Search Engines  
for Research
In today’s world, Internet acts as a very important source of quick reference 
and useful information. We should be careful to ensure that the information is 
authentic, useful and relevant in the context of the incident faced by us.
Using tools / utilities as relevant Use utilities like packet sniffers as relevant to collect more data to provide 
adequate information on the incident so that the action to be taken can be 
understood clearly.
Filtering the data Various tools and utilities like SIEM, IDPSs etc. collect huge amount of data. 
It is not possible to go through each of these data. Data need to be filtered 
suitably and appropriately to identify possible patterns and possible indicators.
Seeking assistance from others Various governmental and non-governmental sources can provide us 
information as to the current incident scenarios which may be applicable to 
us also. Keeping in touch with other Incident Response Teams from other 
companies or governmental and non-governmental agencies / forums can 
provide us crucial inputs on recognizing the incidents as well as analyzing the 
incidents effectively. However, caution should be exercised as to when we need 
to share the information.
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Incident Impact Analysis and Prioritization of the Actions2
An incident may have impact on the functional aspects or on the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) 
aspect of information security or both on the functional aspects as well as the CIA aspect of information security. 
Higher the impact, higher shall be the prioritization related to the actions to contain or to recover from them. 
Recoverability effort is also one of the important aspects which drive the prioritization of the actions. It is possible to 
recover from some of the incidents very easily with low effort, such as an isolated breach of one of the non-critical 
servers. It may be very difficult to recover from some of the other incidents and it may take weeks to recover e.g. a 
major security glitch in the application which is deployed across multiple systems in the organization. Further, in 
some cases if the information is already compromised, such as confidential information stolen already made public, 
there is no way you can recover from the situation for that particular instance.
Incident Documentation and Incident Notification2
Complete details of the incidents have to be captured including the analysis details, causes identified, containment 
actions identified and taken, and corrective actions identified and taken. These details can be tracked through an 
online system wherein the incident handlers need to update the details as they proceed with the analysis and take 
appropriate actions. It is important to document online or through paper based records various information related 
to the incidents. These not only come in handy later come in the evidence to be produced before legal authorities but 
also as future knowledge base as to what were the indicators, what were the analysis details, what were the causes, 
what actions were identified, which actions worked and which did not, whether the containment was effective, and 
if so to what extent, what was the magnitude or impact of the incident, whether the recovery actions worked or not, 
etc. These are crucial knowledge from the future perspective. Hence, the documentation cannot be ignored. Similarly, 
updating the status of the incident regularly on the online system should not be forgotten as the Incident Response 
Team Leaders as well as other key stakeholders like CIO, Chief Information Security Officer, or Owner of the data or 
system compromised, may be reviewing the status online or Incident Response Team Leaders may use the status for 
internal and external communication. Any wrong communication gives the wrong impression about the organization.
All the relevant and identified stakeholders (i.e., internal as well as external), depending upon the incident and 
corresponding incident response plans and processes, have to be communicated with regularly on the incident and 
its status. Typical stakeholders for the incident reporting are Chief Information Security Officer, Chief Information 
Officer, Business / Data / System Owner, Other internal and external Incident Response Teams, Human Resources  
(in case of breaches by employees), Public Affairs department (incidents of public concern where the status need  
to be informed to the public or where the incident attracts adverse publicity), Legal Department (where there are  
legal implications of the incident or where the incident has to be dealt with legally), and other governmental  
agencies / departments as relevant.
Incident Containment, Eradication, and Recovery2
Incident containment is very important to limit the impact on the business. The containment actions may be 
disconnecting or isolating the infected system from the network so that it does not infect other systems. Subsequent to 
the containment or in conjunction with the containment eradication of the cause(s) of the incident has to be done by 
identifying appropriate corrective actions. If mistake proofing of the systems is possible, like reconfiguring the system 
and thus avoiding recurrence of the same incidents in the future, the mistake proofing has to be attempted. However, 
you may have to weigh the costs of actions against the benefits from the actions and the residual risks. Further, 
recovery has to be attempted to ensure that the systems are restored effectively to their original positions at the time 
of the incident, such as if the data integrity is impacted because of the incident, then the data has to be restored to the 
accurate data by either nullifying the impact of the incident or to the last known state of data with the integrity intact 
and further transactions have to be re-applied. If the availability of the data is impacted the system has to be restored 
so that the legitimate users can access the same, such as after a DDoS the access to the server / system is restored 
to the legitimate users. In case of impact on confidentiality, possible eradication may be removal of the published 
data from those sites which had published the same (possibly nothing much could be done if somebody had already 
copied the data from there). All of the three aspects are important to ensure the effectiveness of the incident response.
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Containment Strategy2
Early containment is important to the success of effective Incident Response. Containment reduces the actual damage 
or inhibits the resources from being exhausted, such as delinking an infected machine limits the spread of infection 
to other machines or diverting the attacking traffic to a sandbox, which avoids a denial of service attack. Containment 
strategy shall be spelt out clearly so that the incident handlers do not get confused but have absolute clarity on what 
prioritizes the containment. Sometimes it may be dangerous to carry out the containment if the containment action 
may make malicious software to act differently or severely. Hence, containment action should be well thought out by 
the experts. Some of the criteria for containment strategy are:
Possible damage if the containment action is not carried out•	
Whether the damage is likely to be increased if the containment is not carried out•	
Services assured to the customers•	
Time and resources needed to implement the containment strategy•	
Type of the containment solution (temporary, permanent, etc.)•	
Likely effectiveness of the containment strategy•	
Evidence preservation requirement (NIST’s SP 800-61 Rev 2)•	
The containment strategy should be kicked in as early as possible if the damage is likely to escalate because 
of further compromises possible or is likely to spread significantly impacting other business areas. However, the 
downsides of a containment action, if any, have to be understood before applying the containment actions.
Evidence Gathering and Handling2
Evidence needs to be gathered from two perspectives: first to understand how the attack is happening and where the 
attack is happening, second is to capture and preserve the evidence if legal ramifications are there or a legal battle has 
to be waged against the incident subsequently. If the evidence has to be used for legal purposes, then the evidence 
has to be collected as per the legal requirements, according to the prior consultation and understanding from the 
legal experts. It is also necessary to document how and when the evidence was collected and how it is preserved, how 
it is protected. A chain of custody for the evidence with clearly documented handover should be preserved. It is also 
necessary to take a snapshot of evidence as early as possible before application of any containment action so that the 
evidence is of value during the legal proceedings.
Eradication and Recovery2
Eradication is carried out as soon as possible. Eradication is getting rid of the vulnerabilities exploited or infection, 
such as a virus that infected being deleted, the misconfiguration of the system which was exploited is corrected, 
the defect in the application which was exploited is fixed, the operating system weakness which was exploited is 
appropriately patched, and changing the compromised passwords. Understanding the cause(s) of the incident is very 
important to do effectively.
Recovery is restoring the system back to normalcy, that is, undoing the adverse effects of the incident by restoring 
back the crashed operating system, correcting the integrity of the database, restoring back the correct data if the 
integrity of the data was impacted, or setting right the parameters altered by the incident.
Also, it may be useful to ensure from the learning of the incident that better logging, auditing, and monitoring are 
built into the systems so that the future detection of such incidents is easy. Effective eradication and recovery is often 
not easy and takes time. Some of them require infrastructural changes which may need budgeting, proper impact 
study, evaluation of alternative tools, and a plan for implementation of the selected tool.
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Once the eradication and recovery is completed, the compromised system(s) need to be monitored to ensure 
that the eradication and recovery are effective. This gives the assurance that the incident is either possible to be 
detected easily in the future if it repeats or such incidents are possible to be prevented.
Post Incident Analysis and Activities2
Every incident and the way it was handled, provides significant learning which cannot be lost. The learnings from 
each incident need to be captured and analyzed so that the learning can be applied to future incidents as applicable. 
Also, in case legal actions are to be pursued then the evidence has to be organized and submitted to the appropriate 
authorities so that the legal actions can be initiated and pursued effectively.
Analysis of Learnings
Analysis of the learnings has to be carried out at least in the case of major or critical incidents. Periodic analysis 
meetings can be carried out in respect of collation of the learnings from other incidents. Ideally all the stakeholders 
who were involved in the incident detection, incident handling, and incident response should be involved in the 
meeting. The entire incident has to be deliberated upon and the results have to be collated:
What had happened and when?•	
Whether all the contacts could be contacted or were there issues in reaching the contacts •	
like wrong e-mail ids or wrong / old contact numbers or the resources had already left the 
organization?
Whether the incident response processes were effective or had to be modified on the fly to •	
handle the incident effectively?
Whether the incident handling led to any side-effects or adverse impacts and if so, what were •	
they and how could they have been avoided?
Was there a better way to respond to the incident than the way it was handled?•	
Was there a better way to organize the response team?•	
What information was needed but was not available on time?•	
What learning from this incident can be applied to avoid probable similar incidents?•	
What precursors and / or indicators were useful in identifying the incident and which of these •	
will be helpful for future?
Was the internal communication and external communication effective? Were they useful? •	
Are there possibilities to improve upon these?
What utilities / tools are required to better identify, prevent, analyze, or handle such incidents?•	
Data related to the incident like duration of the incident, efforts spent on various phases of •	
incident handling, types of incidents and their categorization based on various aspects like 
attack vectors used, external / internal attacks, etc.
Many more such questions can be asked to understand what went right, what went wrong, what could be done 
differently or better going ahead, and how these learnings will be useful for the future.
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Use of Incident Data2
After analyzing these learnings, the improvement activities based on these learnings have to be initiated which may 
lead to the update of the Incident Response Plan and Incident Response Processes. Also, awareness and trainings may 
have to be improved based on these learnings.
Further, where legal actions have to be initiated, the details of the evidence collected have to be submitted to the 
legal department so that they can arrange for the legal recourse.
Data collected during the incident analysis has to be retained for a sufficiently long period for the following 
reasons [3]:
Some of these may be useful at a later period of time, as some of the impacts of the incidents •	
which are not identified now, may be identified later
Some traces of future incidents may be found or some activities which are precursor activities •	
for future incidents may be possible to be correlated to at a later date
Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity
As we discussed in the Introduction to this Chapter, Disaster Recovery normally applies to the IT infrastructure and  
IT systems even though it can be applied by some organizations in the context of all disasters. Business Continuity  
as mentioned here below provides for continuity of business in the context of disasters as well as business recovery 
post disasters. Normally, Incident Response Mechanisms handle disasters of smaller gravity, particularly security 
incidents and Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity Plans address higher order disasters. An organization may 
have a single plan covering all incidents and disasters or may have different plans for different aspects. However, 
where the organizations have multiple plans, it should be ensured that the scope of each plan is clearly defined and 
there is no conflict between these plans, instead these plans complement each other. In the following sections, we 
discuss all the three plans: Disaster Recovery Plan, Business Continuity Plan and Business Recovery Plan. All of these 
plans form a single composite plan that is known as Business Continuity Plan.
How to Approach Business Continuity Plan
A clear approach to the formulation of the Business Continuity Plan ensures that it considers all the important aspects 
and according to the scope of the business continuity that the organization wants to achieve.
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Assign Clear Roles and Responsibilities
For any project to be successful, it is necessary to define and assign clear roles and responsibilities. This is true even in 
the case of the formulation of Business Continuity Plans. The important roles and responsibilities in the context of the 
formulation of the Business Continuity Plans are described in the following sections.
Sponsor
Any plan will not be successful if there is no top management commitment. It is necessary from the perspective of 
provision of resources, allocation of sufficient budget, and getting the requisite infrastructure that Business Continuity 
Planning effort has the concrete backing of the top management. Ideal sponsor for the Business Continuity Plan is the 
Chief Executive Officer or the President or the Vice President of the organization. In case of specific unit level plans 
it can be the head of that particular unit. Such a person should demonstrate not only his / her commitment through 
funding and provision of resources, but also by intervening and resolving any barriers to the effective formulation 
of Business Continuity Plans. The sponsor should discuss with the Project Manager and formulate the scope of the 
Business Continuity Plans so that the Business Continuity Planning Team puts its efforts in the right direction and 
without any ambiguity. Budget for the entire business continuity planning also should be decided and conveyed by 
the Sponsor to the Project Manager.
Project Manager
Formulation of the Business Continuity Plan should be treated like a project. Hence, there should be a designated 
project manager. In the context of the Business Continuity Plan this person is normally known as Business Continuity 
Planning Coordinator. Some organizations may call such a coordinator as Contingency Planning Coordinator. 
Business Continuity Plan formulation project should have a planned start date and a planned end date. The activities 
or tasks to be carried over this period of time should be clearly planned in the schedule with the responsibility 
clearly assigned to relevant and appropriate personnel. Dependencies between various steps or tasks or activities 
of the plan have to be identified. A tool like Microsoft Project Plan or any other scheduling software or tool should 
be of help to carry this out effectively. The Project Manager or the Business Continuity Planning Coordinator can 







Figure 5-4. Components of Business Continuity Plan
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internal management person supported by an identified external consultant. Communication Plan is an important 
component of planning for Business Continuity Plan formulation. It is the responsibility of the Project Manager or the 
Business Continuity Planning Coordinator to ensure an effective Communication Plan.
Business Continuity Planning Team
The Project Manager or Business Continuity Planning Coordinator in discussion with the sponsor or on his/her own 
should identify the team members who need to be part of the Business Continuity Planning Team. Ideally it should 
be a cross-functional team representing the members from the business, IT team, information security team, facility 
management and security team, human resources team, Sales and Marketing, Community Relations and Public Affairs, 
and Supply Chain / Purchasing, Finance. Experts or external consultants may also be included as part of the team.
Life Cycle of Business Continuity Planning
For Business Continuity Plans to be effective in addressing all the components of the plan including disaster recovery, 
business continuity and business recovery, organizations need to follow a well-defined Life Cycle of Business 
Continuity Planning. The success of the organization and its ability to withstand a disaster or serious business 
disruption depends upon the adequate thinking provided to each aspect of the life cycle, detailing of the same so that 
it is understood by everybody as relevant, tested for the assurance that it will work as expected in case of need and will 
enable the organization to bounce back effectively and efficiently on to the path of business continuity and business 
recovery. The Life Cycle of Business Continuity Planning is illustrated in Figure 5-5.
BCP Scoping
















Figure 5-5. Business Continuity Planning Life Cycle
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Scoping
Appropriate scoping is very important and the starting point of a good Business Continuity Planning exercise. 
Whether the scope is the entire organization, for specific location, for specific business, or for specific department 
should be clearly set by the Sponsor of the Business Continuity Plan in his / her discussion with the Business 
Continuity Planning Coordinator. The scope should be written down and signed off by the Sponsor to ensure 
that there is no disconnect between what was expected by the Sponsor and what was understood by the Business 
Continuity Planning Coordinator.
Plan for Formulation of Business Continuity Plan
A draft Project Schedule has to be prepared with a clear planned start date and planned end date. Various activities or 
tasks to be planned to formulate the Business Continuity Plan are identified. Assignments of the planned activities to 
various team members are also carried out. Dependencies between various tasks are also identified. Pre-requisites for 
important activities and success criteria for important activities are also identified.  This draft schedule is discussed 
with the Business Continuity Team during the Business Continuity Plan Kick-Off Meeting and is finalized.
Communication Plan is an important component of planning for Business Continuity Plan formulation. This 
plan very clearly delineates how the status of the formulation of Business Continuity Plan is communicated to various 
stakeholders including the Sponsor and when and how the issues related to the plan are communicated. This plan 
also delineates channels of communication and various meetings that are part of overall communication strategy. 
This also includes the communication of any changes including changes to the scope, changes to the cost, and 
changes to the project plans. This draft communication plan is discussed with Sponsor to check that the plan is as 
per the expectations of the Sponsor. This plan is then discussed broadly during the Business Continuity Plan Kick-Off 
Meeting and agreed to.
Business Continuity Plan Kick-Off Meeting
This is an important meeting of the Business Continuity Planning Team wherein the scope of the Business Continuity 
Planning is discussed so that everybody on the team is clearly aware of the scope. The broad plan prepared by the 
Business Continuity Planning Coordinator will be discussed with the team and depending upon the team’s views 
necessary additional tasks / activities are incorporated, timelines are revised, dependencies are added / modified, 
and the responsibilities for various tasks are reassigned where required.
This meeting also discusses the risks to the schedule, risks to the achievement of the objective of the plans, and 
risk of the resources planned to be employed (non-availability, over engagement in other critical activities etc.).
Any issues expressed by the team members are considered, discussed, and necessary actions to be taken are 
planned for / determined.
Business Impact Analysis (BIA)
Business Impact Analysis is at the heart of Business Continuity Planning. Data from various local agencies, regional 
agencies, national agencies, and international agencies, as relevant, are collected related to applicable disasters and 
taken into consideration during the Business Impact Analysis.
The first activity as a part of the Business Impact Analysis is to list out various Business Lines of the organization 
and to understand their relative contribution to the organization and their relative criticality in terms of revenue 
and profitability. This also has to take into account impact on the customers of those business and possibility of 
the customers moving to other organizations if they are not supported. Business Impact Analysis will allow an 
organization to determine as to how much time each of these business lines can be down without significantly 
impacting the customers, and also how much a reduced level of service can sustain the business for some time.  
Table 5-10 provides an example of how different lines of business determine the criticality of business continuity and 
recovery.
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Assurance made to the customers of various service levels, impact on the customers due to the business 
downtime / service downtime are taken into account and minimum time within which business needs to be 
continued even at the reduced levels of scale or reduced service levels have to be identified. This step is very crucial 
for the success of effective business continuity.
Then we look at the risks to the systems enabling and supporting each of these business lines including IT 
infrastructure, software, applications, tools, and utilities from various applicable threats or scenarios including from 
natural disasters, infrastructural breakdowns, riots and strikes, system downtime because of issues like virus infection, 
and server crashes. We identify the top risks based on their probability of occurrence and their likely impact on each 
of the business lines. We use the data available while arriving at these. The focus here is on availability as this is the 
risk we want to cover primarily as part of BIA. However here, we go beyond the normal risk assessment and assume 
that the disaster is likely to happen and think of what steps the organization needs to take to recover from disasters 
and continue the business if the disaster comes true in spite of controls put in place.
On the basis of the criticality of various Business Lines and the corresponding applicable risks or scenarios, 
relative ranking is used for prioritization of recovery and focus on business continuity. This step is very crucial for the 
success of effective business recovery. Additionally, it is good to understand, at this point in time, the implication of 
downtime or disruption on the confidentiality, integrity, and primarily availability (as BCP addresses primarily the 
issue of availability). The same guidelines from NIST’s FIPS PUB 199 as used in the Risk Management Section may be 
referred to understand the impact. The rating may be 1 or Low; 2 or Moderate; 3 or High i.e. one in a numerical scale 
and the other at risk level.
From the above the following three important aspects of Business Continuity and Recovery are decided:
Maximum Tolerable Downtime (MTD): This is the downtime or outage or disruption considered as tolerable by 
the stakeholders particularly business users in the context of a specific business line. Beyond this period of downtime, 
it will be perceived that the downtime will have severe impact on the business. This provides the inputs for the 
recovery method and processes to be used.4
Recovery Time Objective (RTO): This is the maximum time by which the recoveries of the affected systems have 
to be accomplished. This provides the input for the technologies to be used for effective recovery. This has to be less 
than the MTD as the recoveries of the systems well before the MTD are necessary to ensure that the business can be 
carried out effectively after MTD. Further, testing of the integrity of the system and data restored shall also be checked 
and ensured before MTD. This provides for time to get a new server (rented or redeployed within the organization 
or leased etc.), install the operating system, install the application, configure the system appropriately, restore the 
backup from the backup media, check the system for effective restoration and roll it out for production, etc. Where 
the RTO is more than the MTD, then the Top Management has to be consulted as to the risks to the business and 
necessary steps as required have to be planned for as per the guidance of the Top Management.4
Recovery Point Objective (RPO): This is the point of time before the disaster or disruption or outage that the 
system can be brought back to. This applies to the data and usually depends upon the number of hours of data we can 
afford to lose. This decides the required backup frequency and type of backup. If the data is critical and can’t be lost 
at all, then online real-time mirroring of the data may have to be looked into. However, whenever strategizing such 
things the cost vs. benefits have to be considered.4
Table 5-10. Criticality Analysis of Different Lines of Business
Business Line Business Share  
(% of total business of the organization)
Profitability % Criticality of Business 
Continuity and  Recovery
Business Line A 54% 12% Critical
Business Line B 17% 18% Critical
Business Line C 15% 5% Non-Critical
Business Line D 14% -2% Non-Critical
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The analysis that we’ve discussed is better known as the Business Impact Analysis (see Figure 5-6). Typically, 
the organization determines five business areas and five relevant disasters (as per the thumb rule), which need to 
be addressed for business continuity as well as recovery. This number may vary from organization to organization; 
however, looking to continue all the business lines, and always at the same level of performance, is possible to achieve 
only at high redundancy. It requires a high investment to support business continuity, and may not be a prudent 
business decision. As mentioned earlier, based on the relative criticality of the selected business lines, the recovery 
and continuity efforts are prioritized. Consequently, critical systems supporting those business lines and the priorities 
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Figure 5-6. Business Impact Analysis3
For some customers or some businesses, it may cost significantly if the business doesn’t continue at the time of 
disaster or as early as possible after the disaster. For example, e-commerce business with high competition and huge 
volumes of business may lead to huge losses or potential business losses even if the systems are out for part of the day. 
Hence, we need to identify the need for continuity of business while recovery efforts are underway.
Adequate and appropriate resource deployment is the next important step in the process of effective recovery. 
Facilities, staff, hardware, operating system and other software, application software, data, tools and utilities, and 
relevant records are the important resources required to ensure effective recovery. These should be identified well 
ahead of time in appropriate quantity with appropriate capability to ensure effective and efficient recovery.
Again, while most focus is on recovery, as discussed earlier, not all business lines may require continuity of 
business immediately after the disaster as this can be enabled in case of most disasters only at a high cost like hot sites 
setup and maintenance.
Whether the business can be continued at a lower scale from the same site or from another alternate site depends 
upon the type of disaster impacting the current site. Heavy floods or huge fires or earthquake, or damages on account 
of terrorist strikes through bombs etc. may lead to total or high devastation at the current site and hence it may not be 
possible to recover the services mostly within the MTD from the same site. Hence, in case such disasters are perceived 
strongly (i.e., with relatively high probability), then business continuity or business recovery from other alternative 
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sites may have to be planned for. If the immediate continuity of the business from another site is required, then 
alternative hot sites may have to be setup. If the business can wait for some time, then there is a possibility to recover 
and continue the business from other alternative sites by having alternative warm sites. If there is substantial time 
available as MTD, then it may be enough to have a cold alternative site or a reciprocal arrangement with some other 
organization. These alternative sites may be the ones owned already by the organization or may be the sites leased 
out for the specific purposes of business continuity or may be the sites of other organizations with which we have 
reciprocal arrangements.
In most of the cases, the disasters may have localized impact in which case business may be possible to be routed 
temporarily through some other sites where possibly only the personnel have to be shifted temporarily along with the 
requisite equipment like laptops etc. Some of the cases can be handled effectively by having reciprocal arrangements 
with other organizations in a neighboring town or city which can be easily reached within a reasonable time-frame.
Business Continuity Plan Preparation
Once the business lines to be supported along with the applicable disasters and the corresponding systems to be 
recovered and / or business operations to be continued from alternative sites are decided along with the priorities 
attached to them, the detailed Business Continuity Plan is drawn up.
The Business Continuity Plan lists out the Business Lines determined to be supported (as per BIA) as part of BCP 
as per their priorities. For each of the business lines the top few identified and applicable disasters impacting them 
as determined during the BIA are listed out. Based on each disaster scenario, the systems to be brought up and the 
resources required for the recovery process are listed as determined during the BIA.
The next step is to identify the Preventive Controls. Preventive Controls are such controls which make it possible 
to reduce the impact or the possibility of some of these disasters, such as fire through mechanisms like smoke / fire 
detectors, fire alarm systems, and fire suppression systems. Many of these would have been considered as a part of 
organizational information security risk management activities. If not, possible preventive controls are now identified 
and assigned to appropriate personnel for effective execution.
For each of these listed disasters, what should be done during the first 24 hours, first 48 hours, first 72 hours 
of disaster are identified. These may be arranging for alternative servers, alternative routing of the network traffic, 
operating out of alternative sites (including where applicable other locations of the organization itself), restoration of 
the system files and data on to the alternative servers set up etc. The MTD and RTO are taken into consideration while 
planning these. The objective is to ensure that the business and supporting systems are brought back before the MTD. 
These have to be supported by effective and well-planned recovery processes.
Effective recovery depends upon the contingency strategies planned for. Some of the contingency strategies 
are backup and recovery methods, offsite storage strategies, provisioning of alternative cold, warm, or hot sites. 
Reciprocal arrangements for alternative sites, provision for receipt of backup equipment from the hardware vendor, 
inventory of internally deployable alternative systems necessary equipment to be stocked internally etc. are also 
required to be planned as part of these strategies. Service Level Agreements or timelines have to be agreed with 
suppliers, where appropriate, to ensure timely and effective support. All these should be in tune with the determined 
recovery strategies / plans and should support the RTO and RPO. These should be appropriately captured as part of 
the BCP. Cost vs. benefit analysis should be carried out while deciding these and appropriate strategies have to be 
selected keeping in mind RTO and RPO.
Outage assessment procedures like assessing the cause of an outage, potential impacts of the outage, damages 
possible to the infrastructure and systems, time required to bring back the situation to normalcy, and so on have also 
to be planned as part of the BCP.
Various recovery procedures and their sequence of execution have to be planned for in detail as part of the BCP 
or as addendum to the BCP or as a separate companion plan. Procedures to check the effectiveness of the recovery 
activities during the reconstitution phase also have to be planned for as part of BCP.
Various roles and responsibilities to effectively execute the Business Continuity Plan are determined and 
documented as part of the BCP. While BCP Coordinator plays an important role in the entire planning and execution 
of the BCP, there are other roles and responsibilities which are important to ensure effective execution of the BCP. 
One of these is the Crisis Management Lead who is the senior person from the organization who is empowered to 
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declare the situation as a crisis upon evaluating the scenario and the possible damages or impacts. Other roles may 
be the Travel Coordinator for arranging for travel during the disaster, Purchase Coordinator who initiates necessary 
purchases as per the plan, Facility Coordinator who sets up the alternative site / facility, Server Recovery Team, 
Network Recovery Team, Database Recovery Team, Legal Affairs Team, Public Affairs Team, etc. while the BCP 
Coordinator takes overall lead and provides overall guidance for the effective execution of the BCP. Also, backups for 
each of the critical roles is also decided and assigned as part of the BCP.
Crisis Communication and other communication plans are also part of the Business Continuity Plan. These very 
clearly describe who is empowered to communicate with the internal and external world on the crisis and what kinds 
of communications are normally allowed in case of the relevant disasters. Even the forms and templates as necessary to 
support the same may be provided. The line of communication chart is also provided as needed, if the communication 
at various centers has to be percolated down / to others through various personnel of the organization. Activation 
criteria for important communications like crisis announcement and various notifications to be provided prior to the 
disaster, during the disaster, or after the disaster are also documented clearly as part of the BCP.
The primary and secondary contact details like landline numbers, mobile numbers, e-mail ids, and addresses 
of personnel assigned with various roles are captured as part of the BCP. The contact names and details of various 
critical suppliers like offsite backup custodial service providers, critical suppliers to whom critical work has been 
outsourced, etc. are also captured as part of the BCP.
Designation of the war rooms and the facilities to be available in the war rooms, the type of documentation to be 
carried out during the entire BCP life cycle; who is responsible for the documentation as scribe, and so on are planned 
for clearly as part of the BCP.
The plan is concluded with all the necessary contents as above and reviewed with the sponsor for completeness, 
consistency and correctness.
Business Continuity Plan Validation & Training
The Business Continuity Plan has to be tested and validated to get the requisite assurance that it works effectively 
when required. Testing and exercises are part of this validation. This is an important step of the Business Continuity 
Plan and cannot be missed out.
Testing enables plan deficiencies to be identified and addressed by validating one or more of the system 
components and the operability of the plan. Testing should be performed as far as possible in an environment akin to 
the current operating environment of the organization. Each of the recovery processes mentioned in the plan should 
be tested to get the assurance that they work when executed. Some of the things tested as part of BCP validation are:3
Notification procedures;•	
System recovery on an alternate platform from backup media;•	
Internal and external connectivity;•	
System performance using alternate equipment;•	
Restoration of normal operations.•	 4
This testing has to be carried out methodically using the test plans with clearly defined test scenarios (ideally 
worst case scenarios) and success criteria based on the defined test objectives. Test Plans should also test for the time-
frames for each of the critical processes. This enables us to understand whether recovery is possible as per RTO or not.
Based on the outcome of the tests, necessary modifications or improvements may have to be made to the BCP.
Training on the BCP has to be provided to various roles mentioned in the BCP. The primary focus should be 
on the objective of the plan, communications to be carried out by and among various roles including reporting 
processes, coordination between various roles, do’s and don’ts, team specific processes, responsibilities attached to 
individual roles, and security requirements. All the stakeholders have to be involved in the training mandatorily and 
clarify their doubts so that they are effective when it comes to the execution of the plan in case of eventuality.
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Various exercises are conducted to ensure that the plan is appropriate and works when needed. Some of the 
popular exercises used are:
Table Top Exercise•	 4: This is normally done as a class room discussion based exercise. Here, no 
equipment is used. Various stakeholders meet and discuss their responsibilities in the case of 
an emergency and how will they respond in the context of a specific scenario provided by the 
facilitator.
Functional Exercise•	 4: Simulated environment is used and emergency processes are 
implemented by various teams. The teams carry out their emergency responsibilities in the 
simulated environment. It provides them hands on experience as well as tests the validity of 
the plans and processes. These may be exercising specific responsibilities of specific team 
members or exercising specific processes etc. These may be limited to specific aspects of the 
plans or may be a full scale exercise of the plan.
Table Top exercises may be enough for low impact systems. Limited functional exercises may be required for 
medium impact systems. Full functional exercises may be required in case of high-impact systems.
Up-to-date Maintenance of the BCP
With significant changes to businesses or infrastructure or systems, the BCP need to be reviewed and the need for 
its continued currency or the need for update to the same has to be ascertained. In case, the changes have impact 
on the BCP, it needs to be updated. Where the changes to the BCP are significant, then re-training of the resources 
and re-validation of the BCP are important. Even in case the BCP is static in terms of its technical contents, the BCP 
may require periodical updates and trainings on account of changes to the personnel and their responsibilities, and 
contact details. Like the original BCP, modified BCP also has to be reviewed and approved by the Sponsor of BCP.
Chapter Summary
We discussed security breaches on confidentiality, integrity, and availability aspects of •	
information security. We also made it clear that the risk management, incident response, 
disaster recovery, and business continuity planning are critical to ensure that the impacts on 
or compromises to confidentiality, integrity and availability are reduced significantly. We also 
stressed upon numerous theories around these concepts and found that they are diverse and 
many a time confusing. We also defined some of the key terminologies used in the chapter in 
our simple and practical ways to avoid confusion to the readers.
We explored Risk Management and looked at each of the components of the risk management •	
life cycle including risk identification, risk analysis, risk response, execution of risk treatment 
plans, and periodical risk assessments. Each of these were explained and elaborated in detail. 
Detailed guidelines are provided so that the users can effectively carry out the risk assessment. 
A useful template for risk assessment is also provided as reference.
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We also explored upon the Incident Response Policy, Plan, Processes, and the Incident •	
Response Life Cycle. We looked at the importance of the preparation activities. We elaborated 
in detail upon incident detection including incident analysis, incident containment including 
containment strategies, incident eradication, and incident recovery. We also explained how 
the post incident analysis like learning, use of data collected are important, and useful steps 
leading to the improvement to the incident response mechanisms.
We examined the Business Continuity Plan (including the Disaster Recovery, Business •	
Continuity, and Business Recovery). We elaborated upon the important roles and 
responsibilities related to the formulation of the BCP. We also elaborated upon the planning 
required to arrive at the BCP. We also examined, as part of the BCP Life Cycle, the importance 
of Business Impact Analysis, and how it becomes the base for the formulation of the BCP. We 
also looked at the broad contents of the BCP. We also highlighted the need for validation of 
the BCP through Testing and Exercises. We also explored how training helps in the effective 
implementation of BCP. Then we highlighted the need for keeping the BCP updated with the 
changes.
